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There is a seemingly widespread view that inequality 
should not be a concern in countries striving to fight 
absolute poverty. Although inequality may well be 
high or rising in some developing countries, this 
increase is seen as the unavoidable by-product of the 
economic growth needed to reduce poverty. The 
message for policy is that poor countries—including 
their poor—need not worry too much about 
inequality.  
Does the evidence from country experience 
support this view? This brief first looks at the 
relationship between economic growth on the one 
hand and poverty and inequality on the other. It 
then examines how inequality influences the 
relationship between growth and poverty and 
distinguishes between different types of inequality. 
Finally, some thoughts are offered on appropriate 
policies. 
Growth Is Not Necessarily Inequitable  
in Poor Countries  
The classic argument for believing that inequality will 
rise, more or less inevitably, as poor economies grow 
is the Kuznets hypothesis (KH), based on pioneering 
research by Simon Kuznets in the 1950s. This 
hypothesis states that inequality increases during the 
early stages of growth in a developing country but 
begins to fall after some point. 
Writing in the 1950s, Kuznets had very little 
survey data for developing countries to draw on. 
Since then, there has been a huge expansion in the 
collection of nationally representative household 
surveys for developing countries. These data suggest 
that most growing developing countries have not 
seen the trend increase in inequality predicted by the 
KH. Indeed, very few developing economies have 
seen a trend increase (or decrease) in overall 
inequality. Granted, many countries have 
experienced periods of rising inequality, but they 
have generally been followed by periods of falling 
inequality and have only rarely been sustained. (Box 
1 examines one exception—China—although even 
there the reality is more complicated than implied by 
the KH.)  
To re-examine the relationship between growth 
and changes in inequality, this brief relies on 290 
observations of the change between two successive 
household surveys for a given country, with more 
than one observation for most countries (data are 
drawn from the World Bank’s PovcalNet and World 
Development Indicators). About 80 countries are 
represented, spanning the period from about 1980 to 
the early 2000s. 
Box 1—China: Concerns about Rising Inequality 
China is often cited as an example of an aggregate 
growth-equity trade-off. Probably no other country has 
had the steep rise in both mean income and income 
inequality that China has seen since the early 1980s. 
The evidence shows, however, that periods of more 
rapid growth did not bring more rapid increases in 
inequality. Indeed, the periods of falling inequality 
(1981–85 and 1995–98) had the highest growth in 
average household income. And the provinces that 
started the reform period with relatively high inequality 
had both lower subsequent growth and less sharing by 
the poor in the gains from that growth. 
Although some of the policy reforms and institutional 
changes in China’s economic transition simultaneously 
increased inequality and reduced poverty (such as 
allowing greater returns to schooling by opening labor 
markets, and restoring incentives to work by 
introducing the Household Responsibility System), other 
economic and political forces have been at work to 
generate less benign inequalities. These forces include 
geographic poverty traps (whereby prospects of 
escaping poverty depend causally on where one lives) 
and emerging inequalities in opportunities for enhancing 
human capital, obtaining credit and insurance, 
protecting one’s rights under the law, and influencing 
public affairs. These “bad inequalities”—rooted in 
market failures, coordination failures, and governance 
failures—limit peoples’ opportunities to take action that 
will help them escape poverty. 
It will be harder for China to maintain its past rate of 
progress against poverty without addressing the 
problem of rising inequality. If recent history is any 
guide to the future, the historically high levels of 
inequality found in many provinces today are likely to 
inhibit future prospects of poverty reduction. Other 
factors point to the same conclusion. It appears that 
aggregate economic growth in China is increasingly 
coming from sources that bring more limited gains to 
the poorest. The “low-lying fruit” of efficiency-
enhancing pro-poor reforms may be becoming scarce. 
Inequality is continuing to rise, and poverty measures 
are becoming more responsive to rising inequality.  
At the outset of China’s current transition period to a 
market economy, levels of poverty were so high that 
inequality was not an important concern. That situation 
has changed. 
October 2007 
2 
Taking this period as a whole, there is little or no 
correlation between changes in inequality and rates 
of economic growth. Comparing the changes in a 
measure of inequality, the Gini index, with changes 
in average real income shows that among growing 
economies, inequality increased about as often as it 
fell. That is also true of contracting economies.   
If one focuses solely on the period since the 
early 1990s, there are signs that a positive 
correlation is emerging between rising inequality and 
economic growth. It appears that the recent growth 
processes seen in many reforming economies have 
put upward pressure on inequality. There are 
exceptions, however, in that growth since the early 
1990s has accompanied falling inequality in some 
countries. Nor is the overall positive correlation in the 
data after 1990 robust to corrections for 
measurement errors. As a generalization across 
country experiences, it still appears that growth 
tends to be roughly distribution-neutral on average.  
One should be cautious about the policy 
interpretation of this finding. The lack of a robust 
correlation between changes in inequality and 
growth does not imply that policymakers aiming to 
fight poverty in any given country can safely focus 
on growth alone. Putting measurement problems to 
one side, this empirical finding merely reveals that, 
on average, there was little effective redistribution in 
favor of the poor. It does not say that redistribution 
rarely happens, or that distribution is unimportant to 
the outcomes for poor people from economic growth, 
or that social protection policies are unnecessary. 
Growth Tends to Be Less Pro-Poor in Poor  
and Unequal Countries 
Given that growth tends to be distribution-neutral on 
average, it is not surprising that many empirical 
studies have found that measures of absolute 
poverty tend to fall with growth. The same rate of 
growth, however, can bring very different rates of 
poverty reduction. In trying to understand why this is 
so, it should first be noted that the rate of poverty 
reduction is the growth rate times the growth 
elasticity of poverty reduction, or the “growth 
elasticity” (GE) for short—that is, the proportionate 
change in the measure of poverty that results from a 
given rate. A large negative GE reveals that even a 
modest growth rate can bring rapid poverty 
reduction. For the US$1-a-day poverty rate, the 
average GE is about –2, meaning that a growth rate 
of, say, 5 percent in mean household income per 
capita will reduce the share of the population living 
below the poverty line by 10 percent a year (in 
proportionate terms).   
High initial inequality makes poverty less 
responsive to growth. This is intuitive; given that 
growth tends to be distribution-neutral on average, 
the higher the initial inequality, the less the poor will 
share in the gains from growth. Unless there is 
sufficient change in distribution, people who have a 
larger initial share of the pie will tend to gain a larger 
share in the pie’s expansion.  
Indeed, among the highest-inequality countries, 
poverty incidence tends to be quite unresponsive to 
economic growth. Consider a country with a 2 
percent rate of growth and a headcount poverty rate 
of 40 percent. In a low-inequality country with a Gini 
index of 0.30, the poverty rate will fall by about 6 
percent a year and be halved in 11 years, on 
average. By contrast, in a high-inequality country 
with a Gini index of 0.60, growing at the same rate 
and with the same initial poverty rate, it will take 
about 35 years to halve the poverty rate. Because 
poverty responds more slowly to growth in high-
inequality countries, these countries need unusually 
high growth rates to achieve rapid poverty reduction. 
Poverty incidence also tends also to be less 
responsive to growth in poor countries. The 
combined effect of high poverty and high inequality 
greatly attenuates the growth elasticity of poverty 
reduction. Recall that the average GE for developing 
countries is about –2. Among those countries with 
both high inequality (a Gini index over, say, 0.45) 
and a high incidence of poverty (a US$1-a-day 
headcount index over, say, 25 percent), the median 
elasticity falls to about –1, implying that twice the 
rate of growth will be needed to achieve the same 
rate of poverty reduction. Contrast this with the set 
of developing countries fortunate to have both low 
inequality (a Gini index less than 0.35) and low 
poverty (a headcount index less than 10 percent). 
For this group the median elasticity is an impressive 
–3.4, and even modest growth can result in quite 
rapid poverty reduction.  
How Inequality Changes over Time  
Also Matters 
The empirical finding that growth is roughly 
distribution-neutral on average is consistent with the 
fact that during growth spells, inequality increases in 
roughly half the cases. Whether inequality increases 
or not can make a big difference to the rate of 
poverty reduction. Among growing economies, the 
median rate of decline in the US$1-a-day headcount 
index is only about 1 percent a year for those 
countries for which growth came with rising 
inequality. By contrast, poverty declined about 10 
percent a year among countries that combined 
growth with falling inequality. Either way, poverty 
tends to fall, but at very different rates. 
Consider the growth process in Brazil (a high-
inequality country) in the 1980s. If Brazil’s growth 
had been distribution-neutral, it would have 
experienced a 4.5 percentage point decline in the 
headcount index of poverty. In fact, there was no 
change over the decade; distributional shifts working 
against the poor exactly offset the gains from 
growth. Conversely, even when initial inequality is 
high and the initial share held by the poor is low, 
their gains from growth can be sizable if that growth 
is accompanied by sufficient pro-poor redistribution. 
Falling inequality in Brazil beginning in the mid-1990s 
allowed a faster rate of poverty reduction than the 
level implied by growth alone. 
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What factors underlie the changes in distribution, 
as they affect poverty? A great many country-specific 
factors are involved, including shocks to agricultural 
incomes, changes in the trade regime, shifts in 
relative prices, tax reforms, welfare policy reforms, 
and demographic changes. Generalizations across 
country experiences are never easy, but one factor 
that is likely to matter in many developing countries 
is the geographic and sectoral pattern of growth. The 
greater availability of nationally representative 
household surveys has revealed marked and 
persistent concentrations of poor people in specific 
regions and sectors, even in countries with high 
growth. The extent to which growth favors the rural 
sector is often key to its impact on poverty, given 
that three-quarters of the poor in the developing 
world live in rural areas. The importance of 
agricultural growth to poverty reduction has been 
particularly striking in China, where relatively 
equitable access to agricultural land in rural areas 
has meant that poverty is very responsive to 
agricultural growth. Growth in aggregate farm output 
has had about four times greater impact on 
aggregate poverty in China than has growth in the 
manufacturing or services sectors. In other countries, 
however, including Brazil and India, the services 
sector has proved to be an important source of 
poverty-reducing growth.  
There Are Both Good and Bad Inequalities 
High initial inequality can also impede future growth 
and hence poverty reduction. Credit and risk market 
failures are one way this can happen. The credit-
constrained poor tend to have high marginal 
products from investment given their low initial 
capital endowments, but they are unable to exploit 
opportunities for investment. High inequality can also 
foster social conflict and macroeconomic instability 
and impede efficiency-promoting reforms that 
require cooperation and trust. High inequality is thus 
a double blow to prospects for reducing poverty: it 
entails less growth, and it means that the growth is 
less pro-poor. 
However, it is not particularly useful to talk about 
“inequality” as a homogenous concept in this 
context. To contribute to policy, one needs to focus 
on the specific dimensions of inequality that create 
or preserve unequal opportunities for participating in 
the gains from economic growth. There are both 
good and bad inequalities.  
Good inequalities are those that reflect and 
reinforce the market-based incentives that are 
needed to foster innovation, entrepreneurship, and 
growth. For example, a control regime may keep 
inequality low by compressing the labor-market 
returns to schooling or the returns to other forms of 
investment. Reforms in such a regime can increase 
inequality in a way that facilitates more rapid poverty 
reduction by allowing poor people to take up new 
economic opportunities.  
Bad inequalities, however, not only generate 
higher poverty now, but also impede future growth 
and poverty reduction. Social exclusion, 
discrimination, restrictions on migration, constraints 
on human development, lack of access to finance 
and insurance, corruption, and uneven influence over 
public actions are all sources of inequality that limit 
the prospects for economic advancement among 
certain segments of the population, thereby 
perpetuating poverty in the future.    
Recent research has pointed to the importance 
of certain geographic inequalities. Living in a well-
endowed area will sometimes mean that a poor 
household can eventually escape poverty, whereas 
an otherwise identical household living in a poor area 
experiences stagnation or even absolute decline. 
Such geographic poverty traps are one reason why 
some poor areas have often seen lower-than-
average growth and hence stay poor.  
Bad inequality also stems from disparities in 
human resource development. By increasing the 
returns to schooling, freeing up labor markets 
increases the incentives for work and skill acquisition. 
People with relatively little schooling, few assets, or 
little access to credit, however, are less able to 
respond to these incentives. The disadvantages they 
face in these other areas mean that they are less 
well positioned to take advantage of the 
opportunities unleashed by market-oriented reforms.  
For example, although India has relatively low 
overall inequality of consumption, it has high 
inequality in human resource development and 
access to markets. These inequalities have interacted 
powerfully with the sectoral and geographic pattern 
of economic growth to influence India’s progress 
against poverty, which was disappointing in recent 
times, particularly given the country’s relatively high 
aggregate growth rates. 
Policies Need to Reduce Bad Inequalities 
While Promoting Growth 
Accepting that poverty reduction is the overall goal, 
policies that reduce inequality at the cost of lower 
long-term living standards for poor people should 
clearly be avoided. Reducing inequality by adding 
further distortions to an economy will have 
ambiguous effects on growth and poverty reduction. 
It should not be presumed, however, that all 
redistributive policies will result in such a trade-off. 
The potential for win–win policies stems from the 
fact that there are bad inequalities, which come at a 
cost to overall growth and entail that the poor share 
less in the opportunities unleashed by growth.  
More rapid poverty reduction requires more 
growth, a more pro-poor pattern of growth, and 
success in reducing the antecedent inequalities that 
limit poor people’s economic opportunities. What 
types of policies are needed? Some examples of the 
types of policies that can promote poverty reduction 
by reducing the bad inequalities follow: 
• Increase agricultural productivity. Higher 
agricultural productivity promotes growth in 
other sectors, including services, and higher farm 
productivity can be expected to reduce overall 
inequality and poverty within a typical developing 
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economy (where food producers tend to be poor 
and poor consumers have high budget shares 
devoted to food). Achieving higher farm yields in 
rain-fed, drought-prone settings will require both 
more research on appropriate farm technologies 
(including technologies appropriate to labor-
abundant settings) and policy reforms and public 
investments to help assure successful adoption 
of those technologies.   
• Address geographic poverty traps. Spatial 
concentrations of extreme poverty remain, even 
in the more rapidly growing developing 
economies. A recurrent issue is striking the right 
balance between investing in poor areas and 
reducing the cost of out-migration from those 
areas. Does it make more sense to move jobs to 
people, or people to jobs? There is fertile ground 
here for future research. The right sorts of 
investments in poor areas (such as in education 
and managing risks) are also necessary 
conditions for successful out-migration to begin. 
Rural infrastructure development can also play a 
decisive role. For example, research has revealed 
the importance of rural roads to achieving more 
pro-poor growth processes in poor lagging areas 
of rural China. Some research has also suggested 
important complementarities between human 
and physical infrastructure investments. 
• Make markets and governments work better for 
the poor. Policies can also focus on correcting 
the underlying market and governmental failures 
that create high costs of inequality, such as by 
restricting the accumulation of physical and 
human assets by poor people. A wide range of 
policies are potentially important, including 
sound public investments in rural infrastructure 
to support market development, better policies 
for delivering high-quality health and education 
services to poor people, and policies that allow 
key product and factor markets (for land, labor, 
and credit) to work better from the point of view 
of poor people. In rural economies, security of 
access to land through tenancy reform and titling 
programs will often be important. Better 
instruments for credit and insurance can also 
help, both in smoothing consumption and in 
underpinning otherwise risky growth-promoting 
strategies. Affirmative action policies can help 
open opportunities for the poor. Removing 
biases against the poor in taxation, spending, 
and regulatory policies (including policies on 
migration) can also play an important role in 
certain settings. Again taking an example from 
China, reducing the government’s taxation of 
farmers through its underpriced food grain 
procurement quotas has been a powerful 
instrument against poverty. The right 
combination of interventions will naturally 
depend on country and regional circumstances.   
The challenge for policy is to combine growth-
promoting policies with the right policies for assuring 
that the poor can participate fully in the opportunities 
unleashed and so contribute to that growth. If a 
country gets the combination of policies right, then 
both growth and poverty reduction will be rapid. Get 
it wrong, and both will be stalled. 
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